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INTRODUCTION
The Articles and Essays in this issue paint a daunting and depressing
picture. To the near exponential growth in federal criminal statutes,1 we
must add the devaluation of the moral component of criminal law2 and the
expansion of the subject matter of criminal law to diverse issues including
mattress tags, regulations, and morals.3 The consequences of these changes
have been unsettling at best, and corrosive at worst: the prospect of
criminal prosecution may chill the development of intellectual property;4
*
Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; Adjunct Professor of Law,
George Mason University School of Law.
1. John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the
Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545 (2005).
2. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005).
3. Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005).
4. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit
Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783 (2005).
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cause businesses to adopt practices that are inconsistent with good ethical
conduct;5 and drive a harmful wedge between criminal suspects and their
attorneys.6 None of these are good things—nor can any reasonable person
portray them as such.
Must we simply accept this trend? Is there any reasonable prospect for
change? If so, what should that change be and how can it be achieved?
What should be the practical response to the excellent theoretical insights
provided by the authors in this volume?
I.

WHAT CAUSES CRIMINALIZATION?

To understand the possibilities for change, we first need to recognize the
origins of criminalization. At the federal level, that can be answered in a
single word: Politics. As Professor William Stuntz of Harvard has noted,
American criminal law “covers far more conduct than any jurisdiction
could possibly punish.”7 This broad span of American law is the product
of institutional pressures that attract legislators to laws with broader
liability rules and harsher sentences.8 When a legislator is faced with a
choice between drafting a new criminal statute narrowly and potentially
underinclusive or broadly and potentially overinclusive, political
considerations give the legislator an incentive to be overinclusive. Few, if
any, groups regularly lobby legislators regarding criminal law. Those
groups that do are more likely to seek harsher penalties and more criminal
laws, rather than less.9 The political dynamic is exacerbated by the
consideration, usually implicit, of the costs associated with the criminal
justice system. Broad and overlapping statutes with minimum obstacles to
criminalization and harsh penalties are easier to administer and reduce the
costs of the legal system to the government. They induce guilty pleas and
produce high conviction rates, minimizing the costs of the cumbersome
jury system and producing outcomes popular with the public.10
The final piece of the equation is legislative reliance on the existence of
prosecutorial discretion. Broader and harsher statutes may produce bad
5. John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579
(2005).
6. Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669 (2005).
7. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001).
8. See id. at 510 (explaining that the political atmosphere created by “[t]he current
tough-on-crime phase of our national politics” is responsible for the present trend toward
broader liability and harsher sentences).
9. See id. at 552-57 (stating that interest groups often seek to expand the breadth of
criminal liability by lobbying for the creation of new crimes or the expansion of existing
ones).
10. See id. at 536-39 (demonstrating that costs related to the criminal justice system can
be reduced by limiting the number of cases filed, restricting the amount of time spent per
case and by encouraging plea-bargaining in lieu of a criminal trial).
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outcomes that the public dislikes, but blame for those outcomes will lie
with prosecutors who exercise their discretion poorly, not the legislators
who passed the underlying statute. As a consequence, every incentive
exists for criminal legislation to be as expansive as possible.
Nor are these mere theoretical concerns—the natural legislative
incentives have real, and sometimes humorous consequences. As this
essay goes to press, Congress is considering the Horse Slaughter
Prevention Act11 (“the Act”) which, in the last session of Congress had 227
House co-sponsors—more than the Puppy Protection Act.12 The Act would
make it a federal felony to slaughter horses for the purposes of human
consumption. This represents an odd choice if one were seeking to protect
equine life more generally, for the law would continue to permit the
euthanasia of horses for dog food, or to make glue, or for a Godfather-style
warning.13
The troubling aspect of this law is that it is really morals legislation
disguised as a criminal prohibition. In the absence of a well-defined mens
rea requirement, it has the potential to criminalize a great deal of innocent
conduct: those who sell horses without knowing that the buyer intends to
kill them for human food or a buyer who purchases meat without realizing
that it is horse meat are subject to criminal sanction.14 The only barrier to
their prosecution is the “conscience and circumspection in prosecuting
officers.”15 Or, as the Supreme Court said in Dotterweich, Americans are
obliged to rely only on “the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance
of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries” to determine criminal
conduct.16 In effect, the legislative branch has transferred a substantial
portion of its authority to regulate American social and economic conduct
to prosecutors, trial judges, and jurors who lack accountability and
expertise. Thus, decisions on criminalizing conduct are made without any
ability to consider the broader societal impacts of these decisions.

11. See American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act, H.R. 503, 109th Cong. (2005).
12. Cf. American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act of 2004 S.2352, 108th Cong. (2004)
(11 Senate co-sponsors). Compare American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act, H.R. 857,
108th Cong. (2003) (227 co-sponsors), with Puppy Protection Act, H.R. 3484, 108th Cong.
(2003) (53 co-sponsors).
13. In Francis Ford Coppola’s classic movie, one of Don Corleone’s adversaries awakes
to find a horse’s head in his bed. He is, thereafter, much less inclined to oppose the Don’s
insistence that one of his friends have a successful film career. See THE GODFATHER
(Paramount 1972).
14. See Robert Laurence, Cowboys and Vegetarians: The Proposed “American Horse
Slaughter Act”, 2003 ARK. L. NOTES 103 (2003) (criticizing the bill for its narrowly stated
objectives and for its failure to prohibit the slaughter of horses for uses such as pet food and
zoo-animal
food),
available
at
http://law.uark.edu/library/
publications/lawnotes2003/commentary.pdf.
15. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913).
16. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
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II. CAN THE DYNAMIC BE CHANGED?
The answer to the conundrum of criminalization must also lie in the
same, single word: Politics. Those seeking change must demonstrate
concrete political objections to criminalization—ones that will stand as a
counterweight to the natural tendency to expand the criminal law. How can
those objections be advanced? The following subsections provide a few
suggestions.
A. Measure the Problem
Perhaps the easiest first step is the seemingly simple one of requiring the
Federal Government to measure and report on the use of new criminal
statutes. Many of the newer offenses, for example, fit within the paradigm
of “white collar” crime,17 or “corporate crime” but, because of their
comparative novelty, they have never been measured in the same way as
traditional common law crimes.
Programs to track the incidence of traditional crimes have been in place
for decades. The FBI, for example, collects statistics that become part of
its Uniform Crime Reporting Program (“UCR”) which tracks, annually,
the crime rate in various index crimes like murder and robbery.18 Although
the National White Collar Crime Center19 has published reports on certain
subsets of the new criminal code (for example cybercrime), the Department
of Justice has acknowledged that “no systematic data collection” system for
recording the use of newer criminal provisions exists.20
Just as the UCR tasks the FBI with compiling data from state and local
agencies on traditional crimes, the Department of Justice should be tasked
with compiling data on nationwide use of newer white collar and corporate
17. For a discussion of the origins of the term “white-collar” crime, see John S. Baker,
Jr., The Sociological Origins of “White-Collar Crime,” LEGAL MEMORANDUM (The
Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 4, 2004 (explaining the development of the
term “white collar” crime by sociologist Professor Edward Sutherland in 1949, who defined
the term based on the social status of the criminal rather than the basis of criminal intent),
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70073.
18. The most recent Uniform Crime Reports are available on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation website at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm.
19. The National White Collar Crime Information Center (www.nw3c.org) is a
federally-funded, non-profit corporation that conducts research and provides support to law
enforcement regarding certain forms of white collar crime. Its Fiscal Year 2003 budget was
just $9,000,000. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF BUDGET AUTHORITY BY
APPROPRIATION, at www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2004summary/html/ pg4-5.htm (last visited Apr.
14, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review).
20. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001-06 STRATEGIC PLAN 35-36 (2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/mps/strategic2001-2006/goal2.pdf. The last comprehensive
evaluation of corporate crime, for example, was conducted in 1979. See Marshall B.
Clinard et al., Illegal Corporate Behavior (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
October 1979) (on file with author).
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criminal laws. The data could be organized to identify which statutes are
used, with what frequency, at the cost of what resources for each particular
type of prosecution and used to identify trends in burgeoning criminal
categories. The Department could collect criminal enforcement data
categorized by enforcement agency along with prosecution records from
each of the prosecuting agencies. It could then catalog the type of offenses
prosecuted and report on the comparative corporate size of various
violators. Though the development of a consistent methodology for
collecting such data will not be a trivial exercise, there is reason to believe
that collection of criminal prosecution data of this sort is achievable.21 An
improvement in data collection regarding the use of new criminal sanctions
is a vital first step in understanding the phenomenon of overcriminalization.
B. Measure the Costs
Second, we should subject criminal laws to the same cost/benefit
analysis that often attends other legislative enactments. No one, for
example, has ever tried to measure the costs to society of the expansion of
criminal law. That should change.
We know that there are likely to be significant costs—we know that
because, of course, one of the single purposes of criminal law is to deter
conduct. It is a fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system that the
existence of a potential for punishment is intended to dissuade criminal
actors from their intentional wrongful acts. Evidence, although limited,
supports the reasonableness of this insight into human nature—the threat of
punishment deters.22
The entire premise of the utility of deterrence is that for traditional
crimes it is, in effect, costless in its exercise. There is no acceptable level
of murder, rape, robbery or any of the other common law crimes. Thus,
there is no possibility of over-deterring these forms of conduct—we want
21. A recent Government Accountability Office study, for example, collected data on
criminal prosecutions of Federal contractors from various federal regulatory agencies. See
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING: ADJUDICATED
VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN LAWS BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS (2002).
22. See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent
Effect?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344, 369 (2003) (suggesting that the effect of capital
punishment is so strong that each execution deters approximately eighteen murders from
occurring); Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delay, and the Deterrence
of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 305-15 (2004) (exploring the deterrent
impacts of capital punishment and potential length of time spent on death row on the murder
rate by comparing jurisdictions that impose capital punishment with those that do not);
Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The
Truth About Truth-In-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509, 531 (2002) (predicting that an
increase in the severity of punishment for certain crimes may decrease instances of that
crime but may also cause criminals to commit other crimes as a substitute).
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to drive the murder rate down to zero if we can. Put another way, the
criminal conduct at issue in traditional common law crimes is so socially
unredeeming that we want actors to stay far back from the line of
unacceptable behavior. Even if some killings, for example, are justified as
self-defense or as the product of duress, we want those to be exceedingly
rare and, when faced with a choice, we want actors to preferentially decline
to engage in potentially proscribed conduct. And the in terrorem prospect
of criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, is designed to achieve
precisely that result. There is no optimal level of rape or robbery—and so
we punish such crimes in all their forms.
However, that paradigm changes as the Federal Government expands the
scope of criminal law. For example, there is an optimal level in the
production of new intellectual property that is derivative of other creative
efforts. When discussing issues like environmental pollution, the law
expressly recognizes that some production of waste products is the
necessary result of the manufacturing process. Thus, we do not try to drive
the level of pollution or the production of derivative new intellectual
property to zero—rather, we recognize that some optimal balance between
costs and benefits exists, while also acknowledging the difficulty of
defining precisely where that balance should rest. More broadly, there are
many social and economically productive acts that are good in moderation
but bad in excess. When the criminal law is applied to that category of
activity its effect is likely to over-deter conduct that is otherwise useful.
For example, consider the Sarbanes-Oxley act and its enhanced
criminalization of conduct in the securities field.23 Securities fraud is, and
ought to be, penalized. But the issuance of stock and capital formation for
new entrepreneurial ventures are fundamentally positive occurrences. If
Sarbanes-Oxley has the effect of deterring the creation of new economic
opportunities, society will incur a substantial cost. It may be a cost that is
worth the benefit of lower rates of fraud—but there is no way of knowing
that without first assessing the magnitude of the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley
on stock market activity.
To date no one has made the effort to measure these effects—either in
the stock market or in any other regulated field, such as medicine, where
the effects of excess criminalization might be felt. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that these effects can be real—that, for example, in reaction to
Sarbanes-Oxley companies are choosing to list on European stock
exchanges rather than the New York Stock Exchange.24 At a minimum,
23. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(enhancing potential liability for corporations, executive officers and auditors for failure to
comply with the requirements set forth in the act).
24. E.g., Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges,
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one should demand of Congress that it begin efforts to measure these
adverse costs in a meaningful way.
How? It isn’t easy. The costs of criminalization are often difficult to
disaggregate from the costs of regulation more generally.25 And even those
regulatory costs are hard to measure. But hard to measure is not the same
as impossible. Congress can begin by tasking the Department of Justice’s
Bureau of Justice Statistics with collecting data, for example, on the
number of white collar/regulatory crimes prosecuted annually. It can then
require the Department of Commerce, working with the Office of
Management and Budget, to develop an econometric model for estimating
the economic effects of those prosecutions. In order to ensure balance, an
estimate of the deterrence benefits should also be developed, for as we shall
see, nobody measures such results either.
C. Measure the Results
Besides measuring adverse costs or effects and the actual number of
prosecutions, we need to ask criminal law to justify itself by measuring its
benefits, or results. And when we do ask that question, we often measure
the wrong thing.
An anecdote illustrates the problem: One day an observer was out on a
ride along with a local police officer.26 After several hours patrolling the
police car pulled to a stop in an alley behind a small business
establishment. The officer explained to the observer that they were now
“on site” and that, if the police’s intelligence was accurate, someone was
soon going to break into the business.
As predicted, within a short time an individual approached the back door
of the business and, to the observer’s horror, after looking around furtively,
smashed the lock and broke into the shop. The policeman leapt out of the
car, dashed into the shop and arrested the burglar. The result was one
arrest and approximately $500 damage to the business in addition to
substantial inconvenience to the owner and, even if insured, perhaps
increased insurance fees.
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C1; Larry Schlessinger, Sarbanes-Oxley Forces Porsche to
Reverse, ACCOUNTANCY AGE (Oct. 17, 2002) (announcing that Porsche abandoned its New
York Stock Exchange listing in order to avoid complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act),
available at http://www.accountancyage.com/News/1131114; Porsche Won’t List Shares in
U.S., WALL. ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at C16.
25. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, INFORMING
REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2004 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
ENTITIES (2004) (estimating the costs of general Federal legislation), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/draft_2004_cbreport.pdf.
26. I am indebted to Maurice McTeague, of the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University, for this wonderful anecdote.
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“For goodness sake,” asked the observer, “why didn’t you stop him
before he broke the door down?” The police officer calmly answered:
“Because I only get credit for the arrest and clearing the crime. Nobody
counts whether I stop a crime before it happens.”
This, in a nutshell, is the results paradox: You get what you measure. In
the federal system today, we do not measure the correct thing.
Imagine if the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) in the District
of Columbia measured its success by the raw number of murder
prosecutions without disclosing anything about the murder rate. Imagine,
for example, if this year the MPD proudly announced that there had been
fifty murder indictments, up from forty-five the year before.
Nobody would take that sort of measurement seriously. A meaningful
measure of MPD’s success (or lack of success) does not lie in the gross
number of indictments but in more fundamental statistics: Is the murder
rate in DC going up or down? Is the clearance rate, the percentage of
murders that are solved, increasing or decreasing? We would not think that
an increase of five indictments in a year was a good sign, if the per capita
annual murder rate had increased by twenty percent and the clearance rate
had decreased equivalently.
And so, in metropolitan areas across the country, law enforcement
agencies are learning how to measure and report their results. In New York
City, for example, the police department has championed a crime reporting
system that collates data throughout the city, and the department is judged
by its success in reducing crime levels. This change to a results-oriented
measurement is widely thought to have contributed to remarkable
reductions in crime experienced by New York over the past few years.27
Portions of the Federal Government have begun to implement this same
lesson. Federal agencies are required to measure their success in terms of
actual results. The Government Performance and Results Act (“GPRA”)28
mandates annual reports to Congress by federal agencies that report their
performance in terms of outcomes, rather than outputs. To take a rather
simple example, the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (“NHTSA”) does not report on how many rules it issued, or
how many hearings it conducted, or even how many recalls it ordered.

27. For the New York Police Department’s description of its new crime prevention
initiative, see NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, COMPSTAT PROCESS, at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/chfdept/compstat-process.html (last visited on Apr. 14,
2005) (describing the weekly process of the NYPD in which each precinct compiles a
summary of statistics regarding crime complaints, arrests, summonses, summaries of
significant cases and police activity which is then entered into a city-wide database for
analysis).
28. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107
Stat. 285 (1993).
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Rather, NHTSA’s obligation is to report the bottom line outcome that
results from all of its programs—highway deaths, measured on a per capita
basis, increasing or decreasing.29 By focusing on the most important
factors and measuring them, government becomes accountable for results.
You get what you measure.
A large swath of federal criminal law enforcement, however, has yet to
learn this lesson. On the occasion of Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
resignation, the Department of Justice summarized its recent successes,
boasting, for example, that the Corporate Fraud Task Force had, in twentyeight months, charged more than 900 violators in 400 cases and secured
more than 500 individual convictions.30 Not terribly long ago, the
Department’s Environment and Natural Resources Division reported its
annual success, boasting that more than $800 million in civil and criminal
fines had been collected at a cost of only $100 million—a “return on
investment” of 100:1, as if criminal prosecution was a capital product to be
purchased for investment purposes.31
But these measures say absolutely nothing about the effect criminal
prosecution has had on the underlying problems of corporate fraud or
criminal environmental pollution. Without knowing whether fraud rates
are increasing or decreasing, for example, Congress can have no way of
knowing whether these levels of prosecution are optimal. It is entirely
possible that the optimal level of prosecution for corporate offenses
requires a doubling of effort, or a halving. Because federal law
enforcement does not measure its effect on the underlying crime rates, we
do not have a measure of its effectiveness.
That can and should change. Through the GPRA, Congress should
demand that law enforcement in the federal sphere report its effectiveness
in terms of its results—in terms of the ultimate outcomes that it produces,
and not merely its outputs. In other words, Congress should insist on
knowing the real benefits of criminal law and ask the federal law
enforcement organizations to do the same thing that the NYPD has been
doing for ten years. When combined with a concrete measure of its costs,
an accurate picture of criminalization will emerge.

29. See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., FY 2003 PERFORMANCE PLAN
(2002) (measuring results in reductions in number of crashes and fatalities), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/nhtsa/whatis/planning/perf-plans/2003/Index.html.
30. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Farewell Letter to the American People (Nov. 10,
2004),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2004/ag_
farewell_letter_110904.htm.
31. Master of the Court, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 40, 42 (interview with Asst.
Atty. General Thomas Sansonetti).
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D. Reform the Criminal Code
Finally, and most ambitiously, Congress needs to be encouraged to
return to the issue of reforming the federal criminal code. In the late 1990s,
a blue-ribbon American Bar Association Commission cataloged the overfederalization of criminal law.32 Its principal conclusion was that much of
the growth of federal crimes was a result of federal law taking on too many
responsibilities that were best left to state law enforcement agencies.33 A
recent example of that trend is the federal carjacking statute passed in the
early 1990s when concern over carjacking crimes became a short-lived
public concern. Notwithstanding the existence of laws against both theft
and violence in every State, Congress felt impelled by political expediency
to craft a federal prohibition.34 As might be expected, given the prevalence
of effective state law enforcement tools, the federal law has been mostly
ignored, with fewer than 100 federal prosecutions last year, compared to
several tens of thousands of state prosecutions annually.35 Given the small
role that federal law plays, one is entitled to ask whether we need the law at
all.
We can also critique the proliferation of specialized niche criminal laws
designed to address a single, narrow special interest. There are, for
example, broad general laws prohibiting making a false material statement
to an agency of the United States36 and using the federal mails and wires to
perpetrate a fraud on individuals.37 Given these statutes of general
applicability, do we really need specialized statutes making it a crime to
file false environmental reports,38 defraud stock investors,39 or commit
health care fraud?40 Assuredly not. Yet whenever there is regulatory
legislation, advocates for the special interest underlying the legislation
32. See JAMES A. STRAZELLA, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW,
app. C (1998).
33. See id.; see also Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and
Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 53 (1998) (arguing that the level of inefficiency in the
enforcement of Federal criminal laws has led to a trivialization of the criminal law and
reduced its deterrent effect).
34. The original carjacking law was passed in 1992. See Pub. L. No. 102-519, Title I, §
101(a), 106 Stat. 3384 (1992).
35. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
CARJACKING,
1993-2002
(2004),
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/abstract/c02.htm (estimating approximately 38,000 carjackings annually), with ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, STATISTICS DIVISION, FED.
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2004) (reporting 130 auto theft prosecutions nationwide in
FY 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/ D04Mar04.pdf. The
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimate is based on the assumption that not all of the auto thefts
prosecuted in Federal court involved violence against the owner.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78(ff).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1347.
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insist upon their own unique criminal prohibition. It is almost as if no
federal agency thinks itself complete without its own narrow body of
criminal law to enforce.
The growth of federal law has many adverse effects, as the other
contributors to this volume have amply demonstrated. But perhaps the
most insidious effect is that we can no longer say with confidence that
ignorance of the law is no excuse. The maxim was derived at a time and
place when the subject matter of criminal law was widely known in the
community and we could comfortably assume that any protestation of
ignorance was a sham or that one professing not to know of a criminal
prohibition had achieved that ignorance through willful blindness.
We are now, however, at a time when nobody knows how many laws
there are.
Though Professor Baker has offered an estimate, the
Congressional Research Service, the arm of Congress charged with
conducting research on its behalf, has professed that it is impossible to
know the exact number.41 If the elected representatives who create the
criminal code cannot catalog it, what hope has any American for knowing
the criminal law’s full scope?
And so the time has come for Congress to take up the difficult task of
reforming the entire federal criminal code. Attempts in the 1980s failed,
despite substantial efforts.42 The time is ripe for a new effort—at least in
part because the rate of the increase in federal laws continues to rise,
almost doubling in the last thirty years.
To avoid the political problems that frustrated the last attempt, Congress
should be asked to authorize an independent bipartisan commission to
review the entire federal code of criminal offenses and to consolidate those
offenses in a single title of the federal code. The new code should
eliminate duplicative niche criminal provisions and expunge federal crimes
addressing issues better handled by state and local authorities. At the end
of its work, the Commission’s report to Congress should be subject to a
single, unitary up or down vote on the recommendations—lest the many
compromises and choices made by the Commission be cherry-picked by
varying majorities and the entire report put to death by 1,000 cuts. With
41. See Union Reporting and Disclosure:
Legislative Reform Proposals—
Consideration of H.R. 4054 and H.R. 4055: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on EmployerEmployee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Legal Research Fellow, Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies, the Heritage Foundation) (reporting conversations with CRS and
congressional staff, and explaining that due to the diversity of criminal statutes, their
regulations, and their haphazard placement throughout the federal code, it is impossible to
determine the exact number of federal criminal statutes and regulations), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/107th/eer/lmrdatwo62702/rosenzweig. htm.
42. See Gainer, supra note 33, at 87 (detailing the history of previous attempts to
reform the entire Federal criminal code).
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sufficient political will and commitment, much needed code reform can be
achieved.
CONCLUSION
The agenda for change outlined here is no panacea. It will take hard
work, and a political commitment that has been noticeably absent from
congressional consideration. But one might sense that the tide is beginning
to turn. Both sides of the political spectrum have come to realize that the
proliferation of criminal law, at its core, undermines the moral force of the
law itself. For when everything becomes a crime, then nothing, in the end,
is truly wrong.

